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Cal. Grogan
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ~~DIRECTOR~~

14 January 1957

This memorandum is for information only:

You may care to scan this before you see Baldwin at 2:30 today. After you have finished with him, the group from DDI, DDP, OCI, ONE, and OO will be meeting with him in the Conference Room. Bob Amory will not be present today but we will arrange to see him later this week.

Stanley J. Grogan
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Assistant to the Director

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Hanson Baldwin's nineteen columns on the Middle East, October 28 to January 4 are summarized below.
3. Baldwin arrived in Cairo late in October, coincidentally just before the British-French-Israeli attack. Whether he knew of the pending attack, he did not reveal it in his columns. His first two columns, dated October 28, evaluate Egypt's armed forces as "strong," as far as morale and USSR ground arms were concerned, and weak as far as health and literacy of troops, and air and naval strength are concerned. Soviet arms aid, he said, was greater than any "original estimates" of its scope.
4. The next nine columns are devoted to the British and French military operations (November 1 to December 10), including straight reporting of such matters as air raids (Nov. 1), immobilization of Egyptian air force (November 2), truce and build-up of British and French forces (November 9), Port Said's local problems of drinking water and electric power (November 13), first contingents of UN "police force" (November 16), and the problem of clearing scuttled material in canal (November 16, 18). On December 10 he wrote a general evaluation of British and French military "mistakes" in their 6 1/2 day war, including "delays" in planning (after July 26), confusion of military and political objectives, overemphasis on USSR material in Egypt, failure to anticipate pressure of UN and world opinion, two "erroneous" intelligence appraisals (by British and French, that is), and failure to prevent damage to canal.
5. In his military reporting (above), Baldwin commented on the U. S. only once, and then neutrally, when he said (November 25) that the whereabouts and intentions of the U. S. Sixth Fleet was of "considerable concern" to the British and French during the operation. Nowhere does he discuss the issue of alleged U. S. intelligence surprise, but he did report (November 25) that there was now "indubitable evidence" that UK, France, and Israel did have close military and political cooperation both before and during the operation.
6. Cyprus was discussed by Baldwin twice, on November 23 and November 27. Cypriote underground's terrorism in November was the worst since the beginning in April 1955, with British now having more casualties there than in entire Egyptian operation. Possibility of "limited self-determination" for Cyprus seen by him in visit to London by Governor Harding. U. S. interests are not mentioned.

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7. Baldwin's remaining six columns (December 12 to January 4) are devoted to new prestige of Nasser, decline of British and French influence, increasing USSR overt and covert activity, dangers of Arab nationalism, and alternative policies for U. S.

8. Syria's leftist youth are being armed with USSR weapons, and its radio propaganda techniques being improved by USSR, Baldwin warns, (December 12 and January 2). However, Baldwin says that USSR arms aid constitutes "less than fifty per cent" of Syria's military strength, Syria's leadership is not Communist, and Syria, while threatened by the USSR, is not yet a "Satellite."

9. Egypt is the second major USSR center of activity (January 3). Nasser's prestige, there and in the Arab world generally, is at a new high, although his military reputation among intellectuals is "hollow" and his prestige is a source of worry to other would be Arab leaders.

10. Of the other Arab nations (January 3), Iraq remains the most friendly to the West, although like others, it is being swept by Arab nationalism. Its leader, As-Said, is Nasser's chief protagonist for Middle East leadership; and its arms are dominantly British and U. S. in origin. (December 13, January 3)

11. Chief threats to West (and problems for U. S.) in the Middle East are, according to Baldwin (January 2): rise of Arab nationalism, decline of British and French influence, and Soviet infiltration with arms, economic and technical assistance, and cultural missions and propaganda. (December 23 and January 2) "Subsidiary" problems are protection of oil lines, restoration of canal, and refugees.

12. While no U. S. policy will be a "magic wand," Baldwin says, he suggests four tactics (January 4): (1) on the Israeli-Arab "feud," U. S. cannot side completely with either, but work only for a "straddling" and "compromising" solution, "even if only a transitory one"; (2) on need for a decision whether to join the Baghdad Pact, Baldwin gives pros and cons but no recommendation; (3) on economic aid, he urges a possible "Middle East Marshall Plan" for flood control, irrigation, dams, etc., and (4) on psychological warfare, a "considerably expanded program." In this context, he finds President Eisenhower's recently "doctrine" of some political value (January 4), in opposing USSR's overt measures in the Middle East, but not of value in fighting USSR's "infiltration and subversion." In any case, he ends somewhat pessimistically (January 4) by concluding that all of these approaches "cannot...cure, only...ameliorate" the situation in the Middle East.

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13. None of Baldwin's columns, summarized above, mention either CIA or U. S. intelligence, although one might infer, from his criticism of "original estimates" of Soviet arms deals with Egypt (October 28), that intelligence reporting may have been deficient.

14. His references, finally, to U. S. policies are limited essentially to his January 4 column, in which he discusses, primarily, the policy dilemmas facing the U. S. Government. While he seems to be somewhat pessimistic about long-range solutions, his tone is not antagonistic.

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